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ABSTRACT
This paper contributes by encouraging discussions about the public policy of setting tariffs for public services based on the 
value of the investment made by the providers of these services. The purpose of this study was, in an unprecedented way and 
by combining theories of equity valuation and finance, to identify the asset valuation method that can lead to a fair value 
and balance between an affordable price for the consumer and an adequate return on investment for the concessionaires. 
The value assigned to these assets affects the tariff in two ways: (i) via depreciation/amortization, which affects the cost of 
service; (ii) via the return on investment, which is the portion that corresponds to the investor’s profit. We analyzed the 
Brazilian electricity sector, in which the rates set by the Brazilian Electricity Regulatory Agency (ANEEL) currently use the 
new replacement value (NRV) approach. We carried out empirical tests using data available on the ANEEL website from 
the second cycle periodic tariff review and information obtained in financial statements from 1995 onwards. The analysis 
included the NVR and restated historical cost (RHC) methods, the latter being updated by the extended consumer price 
index (IPCA). After the descriptive and statistical analyses, we used the test of means to verify the differences between the 
variables in terms of NRV vs. RHC. The first conclusion was the absence of a significant difference between the NRV and 
RHC methods; that is, on average, the replacement price showed no significant difference to what would be the pure and 
simple restatement of assets. But this was found to hide something relevant, the fact that this average is derived from two 
main groups: that of the consumers who are paying more for energy services than they should, which constitutes a visible 
benefit to investors and loss for these consumers, and that of the consumers who are paying less than they should, which 
benefits them but harms investors.
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1. INTRODUCTION
This article contributes towards carrying out a critical 
reflection on the different measurement methods and 
approaches used as the basis for remunerating assets 
in the Brazilian electricity sector. It also discusses the 
methodology currently used by the regulator and identifies 
the consequences of maintaining the adopted criterion or 
not, given that these components have a direct impact on 
electrical energy tariff setting. The study aims to reduce 
the existing gap in the accounting literature, not only with 
regards to measuring assets, but also to the accounting 
applied in regulating public services. 
The first privatizations of natural monopolies occurred 
in Brazil at the end of the 1990s. Setting tariffs plays a 
predominant role in this process. When there is a natural 
monopoly, consumers have no alternatives for substituting 
the service, and so state intervention is needed in order 
to find, through regulation, a fair price for and quality 
of service provision.
Thus, in December 1996, the Brazilian Electricity 
Regulatory Agency (ANEEL, s.n.) was created in order to 
regulate and oversee the sector. ANEEL became responsible 
for seeking a balance between the government, consumers, 
and investors, by means of public policies leading to the 
sustainability of the sector, with fair remuneration for 
the investor, affordable tariffs for the consumer, social 
inclusion, and quality of life. After the privatizations and 
over the past 20 years, the tariffs as well as the regulation 
as a whole have undergone improvements. 
Up until the 1990s, the tariff was the same in the whole 
country, but in 1993 they became different depending on 
the region and concessionaire and were set by ANEEL. In 
2014, the average tariff in the country (that is, the average 
of the tariffs charged) was R$276.93, and up until August 
2015 the average tariff in the country was R$365.42, both 
without adding tax. An average variation of 32% can be 
perceived in relation to 2014, which is a reflection of the 
increase in the cost of energy in 2015 and of government 
suppressed prices in previous years.
Tariffs are set by ANEEL in accordance with the 
regulatory model adopted (incentive regulation), in 
which the new replacement value (NRV) approach is 
currently used to measure the investments carried out 
by concessionaires, which have a direct impact on the 
tariff value for final users. However, there are alternative 
approaches that can be used by the regulator, such as 
restated historical cost (RHC) and depreciated optimized 
replacement cost (DORC), among others. And there is 
also the case of those that are not exposed to the tariff 
defined by the regulator.
Thus, considering the context presented, and based 
on theories of equity valuation and finance, this study 
will aim to answer the following investigation question: 
which asset assessment criterion, when used to calculate 
electrical energy tariffs, can lead to a fair value in order 
to strike a balance between a reasonable price for the 
consumer and an adequate return on investment for 
the concessionaires?
A fair value is one that adequately rewards investments 
and results in an affordable tariff. 
As will be shown in the conceptual review, each 
method will lead to different equity values, all of which 
need to aim to protect and maintain long term financial 
(or monetary) capital, remuneration for owners who 
invest in search of adequate returns, and affordable tariffs. 
This argument serves as the basis for developing the first 
hypothesis in the article: in a regulatory environment, 
measuring assets using the RHC method can contribute 
to achieving a fair value for the investor and the consumer.
According to Beesley and Littlechild (1989, p. 455), the 
regulator has to strike a balance between the interests of 
current and future consumers, and between consumers 
and the interests of current and future producers. Thus, 
based on this argument, the second hypothesis raised is 
that NRV leads to current consumers bearing the costs 
of a good that will be acquired in the future and not the 
services already provided. 
In light of the technical support presented in the next 
section, some reflections are necessary: is it fair for a tariff 
to lead to company revenue values that exceed the capital 
invested and the return on this, with the aim of replacing 
the asset, which in the future may cost more? And can it 
be that with regards to effective replacement, the value 
is different from the one forecast, be it higher or lower? 
In other words, is it fair, when the value of a concession 
asset is raised, but it still has useful life, for its value to 
increase for depreciation purposes and for the tariffs to 
increase in order to recover capital that has not yet been 
spent? And when NRV is lower than RHC, is it fair for the 
investor to receive a lower return that does not recover 
the capital already invested? These are the concerns that 
motivated the development of this study.
The population studied in this paper includes the 63 
concessionaire companies from the energy distribution 
sector. After gathering the data, the accounting statements 
of each company were monetarily restated up until 
December 2009 using the extended consumer price 
index (IPCA). The constant values in the technical 
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notes, which are calculated using the NRV method, are 
compared with RHC. The test of means is also applied 
to verify the differences in the variables with regards to 
the measurement method (NRV vs. RHC) for the year 
in which the tariff reviews occurred, carrying out a joint 
analysis of the companies.
The results showed that there was no significant 
difference between the RHC and NRV methods for 
measuring assets in the electricity sector, considering 
Brazil as a whole; that is, the use of NRV was practically 
equal to what would be obtained with RHC. However, 
given the spread, this average hides the following: a large 
number of consumers benefitted and a large number were 
adversely affected. Using NRV, therefore, is not the fairest 
method for society. The model based on RHC does not 
result in such an imbalance. 
Sections 2 and 3 present the development of the topic 
and research design. This is followed by the presentation 
and discussion of the results, and lastly, the final remarks.
2. CONCEPTUAL REVIEW
The measurement of assets in the electricity sector 
is a fundamental input for tariff setting and can affect 
investor returns in the future, as well as the prices paid 
by the consumer. Foster and Antmann (2004) note 
that evaluating assets is one of the most difficult and 
controversial aspects of regulation in the electrical energy 
distribution sector, as this does not involve a competitive 
market. 
There is consensus that concessionaires of public 
services should receive a fair return on capital invested 
and that fair tariffs should also be levied on consumers 
and quality services provided. What is disputed is what 
is understood by “fair”; that is, what is the fair value that 
the investor must receive on investments carried out and 
that also results in an affordable tariff. The regulator has 
to seek the means to achieve fair value in a monopolistic 
market, in which the fair tariff value is not the fair value 
used by the accounting standards. For the consumer, 
a fair tariff is one for which the value is not abusive or 
disproportionate to investor costs and return, and without 
there being low quality services; that is, one resulting in 
socially desirable quality of service standards at a fair price.
In this study, the term “fair value” corresponds to 
the value that covers the payment of costs, recovering 
capital invested, and a return on the capital invested 
(investor), as well as accessible tariffs (consumer). A 
fair value is imposed by the market when there is free 
competition, as it depends on consumer willingness to 
pay a particular price. However, in sectors with a natural 
monopoly, the state needs to intervene in order to arbitrate 
the price, since users have no alternatives for substituting 
the product. In order to reach a fair value in regulated 
sectors, assumptions need to be altered, with the aim of 
satisfying the needs of investors and consumers.
Thus, accounting is of the upmost importance in terms 
of providing information on the economic-financial 
situation of companies. However, accounting in itself 
does not ensure fair value tariffs, but it can contribute 
to a fairer measurement of the investments carried out 
and therefore to reaching a fair value for the taxpayer. As 
most of the inputs are commodities, such as aluminum 
and copper, among others, with high market volatility, 
both the investor and the consumer can be adversely 
affected (Pedell, 2006); that is, the risk is to both. However, 
when there is a loss, this is sustained by one of the parties 
involved, through an increase in tariffs or reduction in 
return on investment.
2.1 Regulatory Basis for Calculating Remuneration
The main component of the regulatory basis for 
calculating remuneration (RBR) is the value of assets 
related to providing electrical energy services, which are 
the biggest investments carried out by the companies. 
Among the different asset assessment criteria, ANEEL 
currently uses two methods: (i) the replacement cost 
(RC) method and (ii) RHC method. There are those who 
defend the use of book value, since this represents the 
value paid by the investor, thus being the fair value on 
which the “fair” return should be paid (Greenwald, 1980).
It is important to highlight that this study reviews the 
measurement of assets, which is part of investor return 
on capital, and does not discuss the other regulatory risks 
and opportunity cost that compose tariffs. However, as 
already mentioned, assets value is the main component 
of tariffs. 
According to Foster and Antmann (2004), the different 
assessment methodologies available lead to quite different 
results when applied in regulated companies. There 
are many approaches for measuring assets in order to 
set tariffs. Based on the existing literature, this article 
discusses the methods based on asset costs: HC, RHC, 
DORC, and NRV.
It is understood that the methods chosen cover a large 
portion of the existing ones and some only actually differ 
in terms of nomenclature, given that the concepts are the 
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same. Moreover, independent of the method adopted, 
the primary requisite is consistence in the valuation of 
assets over time, since this helps to reduce uncertainty 
and the perception of risk on the part of investors. Each 
approach is discussed below, laying out the advantages 
and disadvantages.
2.1.1 Historic cost.
The role of HC is to make calculations based on the 
concept that income is the result obtained on investments 
carried out in the past. It compares inflows of funds 
(revenue) with outflows of funds (expenditure) that have 
occurred or are still to occur in order to calculate earnings. 
It focuses on measuring income by comparing past and 
future (recognized receivables) cash inflows with past 
and future (recognized payables) cash outflows over time 
(income statement) and not equity value at a particular 
time. The cash value invested in fixed and intangible assets 
is spread over time via depreciation (or amortization) and 
as a result there is a complete link between income and 
“nominal” cash flow over time.  
This type of cost has been the most widely used basis 
for measurement in accounting (Dameda, Alves & Ott, 
2011; Iudícibus, 2010), since it has the advantage of being 
based on easily confirmable accounting data; that is, it 
reduces the need for judgment when evaluating assets. 
However, for the purposes of remeasuring the economic 
value of an asset, it is only relevant at the time the good is 
acquired or produced, given that immediately afterwards 
this amount begins to lose economic substance as a result 
of various factors, such as inflation and/or a change in 
specific prices due to technology, for example. 
On the other hand, assets recorded at HC in times of 
big technological changes and very low inflation can be 
overestimated in accounting statements, since in this case 
the tendency is for the modern asset to be cheaper, which 
may even require its impairment to be recorded; that is, 
loss of the non-recoverable portion in the future. Part of 
the income calculated via this method may be illusionary, 
since in this aspect in order to calculate income, the date 
of formation is not considered; that is, the actual cash 
outflow date. This income is calculated using monetary 
values on different dates, and thus does not represent 
economic reality. Therefore, part of this income does not 
constitute a genuine increase in equity, which only exists 
due to a surplus to the inflationary effect. HC is not very 
representative as a measure of value, both for measuring 
equity and earnings.
Bringing the discussion to the electricity sector, there is 
not much to be discussed with regards to this method for 
setting tariffs, as the costs are, and must be, updated using 
some general or specific price variation index. Despite 
this method presenting practicality and not leaving any 
margin for judgment, ultimately it is totally or partially 
invalidated in practice, by the persistent inflation, be this 
higher or lower in the long term, in any country. 
2.1.2 Restated historic cost.
RHC is the value by which a good, revenue, or expense 
is recorded by its original value updated using a particular 
general price variation index; that is, keeping the original 
cost at a later date is made possible. It does not concern 
current cost, but simply recalculates HC in accordance 
with variations in the general purchasing power of a 
currency. Thus, it does not represent a new sales value on 
the asset market, but rather the investment made in the 
asset updated monetarily or the value of an expense or 
revenue also corrected for inflationary effects. Its aim is 
simply to reflect the effects of inflation and not to produce 
market values.
According to Martins (1972, p. 2), with this method 
it is possible to put various costs occurring on different 
dates into purchasing power values on the same date, 
resulting in better comparability. This comparison is one 
of the great advantages of this method; that is, to bring 
transaction values to the same date and to a currency with 
the same purchasing power. It thus enables the application 
of the concept of income based on maintaining monetary 
capital; that is, that income is the value in excess of the 
monetary capital originally invested; only improved by 
correcting this investment monetarily.
In Brazil, monetary restatement of balance sheets 
became mandatory in 1964, with the passing of Act 
n. 4,537/1964 (Brazil, 1964), but it had already been 
facultative since 1944. However, in 1995, this law was 
overruled with the enactment of Act n. 9,249/1995 (Brazil, 
1995). The issue has been quite widely debated by Barbieri 
(1996), Martins (1982, 1984a, 1984b, 1985, 2002, 2004), 
Santos (2001a, 2001b, 2002), and Santos and Barbieri 
(1990). Other Brazilian studies such as those from Brunéli 
(1987), Feitosa (2002), Gabriel, Assaf, and Corrar (2003), 
Salotti, Lima, Corrar, Yamamoto, and Malacrida (2006), 
and Szuster (1985), and international ones such as those 
from Baran, Lakonishok, and Ofer (1980), Davis-Friday 
(2001), and Gordon (2001), have shown the importance 
of recognizing inflation in accounting statements.
It is worth highlighting that due to long coexistence 
with inflation, monetary correction techniques have 
been developed in order to provide useful information 
for decision making, such as balance sheet monetary 
correction (BMC) and complete monetary correction 
(CMC). The main difference between them is that BMC 
only updates the values of “permanent” assets and net 
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equity (long-life non-monetary items), recording their 
effects in a single entry in the income statement; that is, 
simplification is involved. As for CMC, which originated 
together with price level accounting, this updates all asset 
and income accounts, with accounting statement values 
shown in constant purchasing power currency. Although 
BMC results in acceptable net income and balance sheet 
values, CMC presents improvements that enable a more 
exact assessment of assets, since it identifies the items 
that generate losses or gains due to inflation.
Bringing this discussion to the electricity sector, 
measuring RBR in accordance with RHC can cause a 
value of investment that burdens tariffs in the long run, 
compared with what would occur with RC if this were 
lower than the evolution of inflation. Nonetheless, the 
monopolist may not have incentives to carry out prudent 
investments, but instead maintain redundant assets 
with the aim of receiving a return on them; however, a 
governance structure with efficient oversight can resolve 
this question.
Differences can also occur in the choice of index to be 
used (Souza, 2004) or indices can be manipulated by the 
government (as has already occurred in Brazil and appears 
to be occurring in a neighboring country lately) and as a 
result reports can be distorted, this being a disadvantage 
of the RHC method. But the quality of these general price 
indices is determined by their structure, by the samples, 
and by the quality of information gathering, and most of 
these problems also exist when seeking replacement values 
for assets. Each index uses a different methodology and 
is also calculated by various different agencies. 
In this article, the IPCA is defended since it reflects 
official inflation. In the electricity sector, tariffs aim to 
enable investments made in the past to be recovered and 
to also enable an agreed rate of return. This study argues 
that RHC fulfills this aim because it provides a tariff able 
to recover capital actually invested in the past and obtain 
a rate of return on this amount. And, when the useful life 
of an asset reaches its end and it needs to be substituted, 
the investor is obliged to find the capital to carry out the 
new investment, be this greater or lower than the previous 
one, and this new capital will be recovered in the future 
as the good is used and a contractual rate of return is 
obtained based on this new investment. In light of this, 
RHC is an option for setting tariffs, especially because it 
balances costs and benefits and also because it considers 
the historical context and not uncertain and discretionary 
variables. It is also important to mention that even with 
the original value some distortions or imperfections can 
occur in their measurement, especially in the sector being 
analyzed.
2.1.3 Depreciated optimized replacement cost.
This method is seen as a refinement of RC, as it involves 
the current cost of replacing a modern asset, supposing 
that it will be substituted by a more efficient one, and it 
is adopted in Australia and New Zealand. According to 
Economic Insights (2009, p. 8),
Depreciated optimized replacement cost (DORC) is defined 
as the depreciated cost of replicating a system using modern 
equivalent asset values in the most efficient way possible, given 
the network’s service capability, with depreciation based on 
the age of the existing assets. 
However, in a study by Spence (2004), the use of this 
methodology in the electricity sector was analyzed and 
it was concluded that it is a weak concept and does not 
resolve the problems of tariff regulation. Thus, the authors 
defend the use of current cost or a previously agreed 
assessment in order to produce a better regulatory result 
and fairer prices for consumers. 
This method can lead a company to receive tariffs 
as if its infrastructure were new, efficient, and at today’s 
prices, whereas in fact this may involve old assets with 
a long-lasting useful economic life. This means that the 
consumer would be funding an investment carried out 
long ago, as if it were being constructed today; that is, 
current performance being measured based on estimated 
future investments and not on past investments, as with 
RHC.
ANEEL used this method in the 1st CPTR, as there 
were was not yet any reference database available for 
concessionaires. However, as Teixeira (2005) explains, the 
Brazilian experience of applying DORC was a difficult 
process, with undesirable consequences for the regulators 
and society, such as higher temporary tariffs, disincentives 
for investors to make new investments, and a complex 
methodology, leading to a lack of transparency and less 
regulatory body credibility. 
2.1.4 New replacement value.
This method establishes the price of replacing each 
asset, based on a reference company, with this being the 
main difference from DORC, which in turn is based on a 
modern equivalent asset (MEA). In Normative Resolution 
n. 457/2011 (ANEEL, 2011), ANEEL established that 
new replacement value (NRV) “refers to the value of a 
new good, identical or similar to that evaluated, obtained 
based on the concessionaire’s database of prices, or the 
database of reference prices, when validated, or on the 
restated accounting cost”. Anuatti, Pelin, and Peano (2004) 
cite this method as defendable, since it does not adhere to 
accounting entries and seeks to portray the opportunity 
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cost of the capital used, although it is not very widespread 
among Brazilian companies, which can make it difficult 
to apply. 
Therefore, if the new good value is used as the basis 
for setting tariffs, the investor receives a different amount 
from that initially invested. For example, if the cost of the 
good is R$ 100.00, corrected by inflation it would be R$ 
110.00, and if when the tariff is reviewed, the new asset 
assessment is R$ 120.00, the investor receives for the R$ 
120.00 and not for the R$ 110.00 actually spent; that is, 
the investor is rewarded for more than the capital invested 
and by the value of a good that is still to be replaced, the 
price of which may be very different at the time. If the 
opposite occurs, and the NRV is lower than what was 
invested, for example R$ 80.00, the company will lose 
out, since it spent R$ 100.00 in nominal terms and R$ 
110.00 in corrected terms. In this case, the consumer 
benefits and this risk can also lead the investor to only 
enter into the business via an additional rate of return 
that compensates for this new risk.
2.1.5 Advantages and disadvantages of RHC and RC 
(DORC and NRV).
This topic aims to compare the two methodologies 
(RHC and RC), since this study is based on them, by 
revealing the strong and weak points of each one. Table 1 
presents the advantages and disadvantages of RHC and of 
RC and the consequences of applying them. RHC presents 
more advantages than RC, in the view of these authors. 
The disadvantage of RHC for the consumer occurs when 
there is a significant technological advancement that leads 
to a decrease in the replacement value. However, when 
setting the tariff, the investor must be remunerated for the 
capital that was invested and not for what will be replaced 
in the future. Also, with regards to the investment carried 
out, this was what was most efficient at the time, and 
the investor cannot be penalized for this. RHC is more 
transparent and auditable and provides, in real terms, 
the value of the asset that was previously acquired. It 
is this value that should be the basis for remuneration, 
enabling investments to be recovered in consistent real 
terms, thus adhering to the concept of fair value adopted 
in this article. 
  RHC RC
Advantages
Preserves the asset’s value.
Assets close to their economic value.
Recovers the investment and previously agreed rate. 
Auditable.
Enables the application of the concept of income based on
maintaining monetary capital.
Consistent with the concept of fair value.
Disadvantages
Greater degree of subjectivity.
Difficult to find equal or similar assets.
Overestimated when there is a significant technological Less transparent.
advancement, ceasing to benefit the consumer. Depends on events that are yet to take place.
Underestimated if greater investment is needed to The initial investment may not be recovered due to
replace previous assets (due to environmental problems, variability in the price of inputs, which are commodities.
for example), ceasing to benefit the investor. The entire value invested can be recovered besides
obtaining additional cash flow that will not be
  called income.
RC > RHC
Higher tariffs.
Investor remuneration higher than the capital employed.
When the asset is replaced, there is no new investment.
Consumer has already funded the new asset through the tariff.
Investor receives return on capital that was not invested.
Depreciation calculated higher than what the investor spent.
RC < RHC
Lower tariffs.
Investor remuneration lower than capital invested.
Depreciation calculated lower than what was invested.
Does not fulfill the principle of economic financial equilibrium.
RHC = restated historical cost; RC = replacement cost.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
Table 1 Advantages and disadvantages of restated historical cost and of replacement cost.
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Table 2 Final study sample
Period Companies
1 1995-2009 AES Eletropaulo S.A.
2 1997-2009 AES Sul Distribuidora Gaúcha de Energia S.A.
3 1995-2009 Ampla Energia e Serviços S.A. 
4 1998-2009 Bandeirante Energia S.A.
5 2001-2009 Caiuá Distribuição de Energia S.A.
6 1995-2009 Celesc Distribuição S.A.
7 1995-2009 Celg Distribuição S.A.
8 2005-2009 Cemig Distribuição S.A.
9 2006-2009 Centrais Elétricas de Carazinho S.A. – Eletrocar
10 1995-2009 Centrais Elétricas do Pará – Celpa
11 1995-2009 Centrais Elétricas Matogrossenses S.A. – Cemat 
12 1998-2009 Cia. Campolarguense de Energia – Cocel
13 1995-2009 Cia. de Eletricidade do Estado da Bahia – Coelba
14 2001-2009 Cia. de Energia Elétrica do Estado de Tocantins – Celtins
One big disadvantage of RC is its degree of subjectivity, 
which impedes greater oversight by the regulator and by 
society, with it is thus being less transparent. And as the 
values are still to be determined, over a long period of 
time, this amount may be very different from the actual 
future value. As already mentioned, some inputs used 
in the investments are commodities with considerable 
volatility, and depending on the date of the assessment 
report, these prices may be increasing or decreasing, thus 
hampering a fair measurement. This variation can expose 
investors to unexpected risks, and to cover these risks, 
there has to be some compensation, such as an adjustment 
to the previously agreed rate of return. 
For new investors to engage in decision making and 
strategic planning, RC is advantageous, as it provides an 
asset value close to its economic value, but for setting tariffs 
it can be prejudicial for the investor and/or consumer. 
When the RC is higher than the RHC in the assessment 
report for the tariff review (that is, greater than inflation 
in the period), causing a higher tariff than is necessary, 
in this case the consumer will be “funding” a surplus for 
replacing an asset in the future. Conversely, if the RC is 
lower than the RHC, the consumer will benefit, but it 
puts future service provision at risk. The investor does 
not recover the capital previously invested, when another 
reality existed; that is, another technology was available 
at that time and was considered the most efficient.
3. RESEARCH DESIGN
The population studied in this paper covers the 
63 concessionaire companies in the electric power 
distribution sector. The accounting statements required 
by corporate legislation were collected from the Brazilian 
Securities and Exchange Commission (CVM) website 
(http://www.cvm.gov.br) and/or the websites of the 
distributor companies and covered 1995 to 2009. The 
information made available in the public hearings for 
each distributor’s CPTR was also collected, especially 
the technical notes (TN), which provide the definitive 
result, in which the approved values can be found for 
setting the tariffs.
Each company’s accounting statements were monetarily 
corrected up to December 2009 using the IPCA. Each 
distributor has its own tariff review date and the asset 
assessment report is carried out six months beforehand; 
thus, when the review date was, for example, in April 
2008, the report was carried out in November of 2007 – 
the accounting statement used for comparison purposes 
is the annual statement for 2007.
Table 2 presents the final list of companies (of the 63 
companies, only 44 are analyzed due to unavailable data) 
and the period in which the statements were monetarily 
updated. It is worth mentioning that the companies 
analyzed for the 2nd CPTR correspond to 96.55% of total 
consumer units in the country; that is, they represent 
almost all of them, and so the sample is representative. 
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3.1 Sample Treatment
Initially, the data were updated monetarily using the 
model developed by Martins, Salotti, Amaral, Nagai, and 
Melo (2012). The steps were those described as follows. 
Fixed assets in service (FAS) were separated from fixed 
assets in the pipeline, as the latter are not included in 
the tariff calculation because they are not in use; special 
operations (SO) were not subtracted from FAS, given 
that the gross value of fixed assets is initially used. SO 
were subtracted when the basis for remuneration was 
calculated, at the same time they were added to net equity. 
Accumulated depreciation only refers to FAS. The annual 
IPCA rates from 1996 to 2009 were collected, as well as the 
income tax and social security rates. In the explanatory 
notes (EN), the companies that carried out reassessments 
in the period were identified, these being: Ampla Energia 
e Serviços S.A. (Ampla), Empresa Elétrica Bragantina 
S.A. (EEB), Caiuá Distribuição de Energia S.A. (Caiuá), 
Celg Distribuição S.A. (Celg-D), Centrais Elétricas do 
Pará (Celpa), Cia. de Energia Elétrica do Estado de 
Tocantins (Celtins), Centrais Elétricas Matogrossenses 
Period Companies
15 1995-2009 Cia. Energética de Pernambuco – Celpe
16 1995-2009 Cia. Energética do Ceará – Coelce
17 1995-2009 Cia. Energética do Maranhão – Cemar
18 1995-2009 Cia. Energética do Rio Grande do Norte – Cosern
19 2006-2009 Cia. Estadual de Distribuição de Energia Elétrica – CEEE-D
20 2006-2009 Cia. Força e Luz do Oeste – CFLO
21 2004-2009 Cia. Hidroelétrica São Patrício – Chesp
22 2001-2009 Cia. Nacional de Energia Elétrica – CNEE 
23 1998-2009 Cia. Paranaense de Energia – Copel D
24 1995-2009 Cia. Paulista de Força e Luz – CPFL Paulista
25 2006-2009 Cia. Paulista de Força e Luz Santa Cruz – CPFL Santa Cruz
26 2001-2009 CPFL Piratininga – CPFL Piratininga
27 1998-2009 Elektro Eletricidade e Serviços S.A.
28 2002-2009 Eletrobras Distribuição Alagoas – Ceal
29 2002-2009 Eletrobras Distribuição Acre – Eletroacre
30 2002-2009 Eletrobras Distribuição Piauí – Cepisa
31 2002-2009 Eletrobras Distribuição Rondônia – Ceron
32 1998-2009 Eletrobras Distribuição Roraima – Boa Vista Energia
33 2005-2009 Empresa de Distribuição de Energia Vale do Paranapanema S.A. – EDEVP
34 2001-2009 Empresa Elétrica Bragantina S.A. – EEB
35 1995-2009 Empresa Energética de Mato Grosso do Sul S.A. – Enersul
36 2004-2009 Empresa Luz e Força Santa Maria S.A. – ELFSM
37 1999-2009 Energisa Borborema Distribuidora de Energia S.A.
38 1995-2009 Energisa Minas Gerais Distribuidora de Energia S.A.
39 1999-2009 Energisa Nova Friburgo Distribuidora de Energia S.A.
40 1999-2009 Energisa Paraíba Distribuidora de Energia S.A.
41 1999-2009 Energisa Sergipe Distribuidora de Energia S.A.
42 1995-2009 Espírito Santo Centrais Elétricas – Escelsa
43 1995-2009 Light Serviços de Eletricidade S.A.
44 1997-2009 Rio Grande Energia S.A. – RGE
Source: Prepared by the authors.
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S.A. (Cemat), Cia. Força e Luz do Oeste (CFLO), Cia. 
Nacional de Energia Elétrica (CNEE), Centrais Elétricas 
de Carazinho S.A. (Eletrocar), AES Eletropaulo S.A. 
(Eletropaulo), and Rio Grande Energia S.A. (Rio Grande). 
The reassessed values were subtracted from FAS, from 
accumulated depreciation and depreciation expenses for 
the period, as well as from NE. This adjustment was made 
from the year in which the reassessment was recorded 
until its definitive retirement, with the aim of removing 
any correction to the asset that was not by inflation. The 
data were transferred onto an Excel spreadsheet. Then 
the Martins et al. (2012) model was applied. First, the 
annual variations in gross FAS (retirements, acquisitions 
and/or transfers of FA in the pipeline) were calculated, 
by the difference, based on the published data, with the 
same occurring with FA in the pipeline, depreciation, 
and net equity. Then, the FA in service and in the initial 
pipeline were corrected for inflation and for the variations 
in each period.
The same procedures were adopted in relation to 
depreciation, to income, and to net equity, and as a 
result, the deferred taxes were calculated, as well as the 
effects on FA in service and in the pipeline. Deferred 
taxes were calculated on the difference between corrected 
and historical FAS in each period, which also generates 
a liability for the deferment of taxes due to the greater 
corrected net equity than nominal net equity. The 
difference between the final and initial balance of deferred 
taxes is an adjustment to tax expenses for the period, 
decreasing corrected net income. Finally, it was possible 
to compare the historical and corrected values of FA in 
service and in the pipeline, net income, net equity, and 
also calculate the return on net equity (ROE), historical 
and corrected, which will be used subsequently.
After these steps and with the data already corrected 
using the IPCA, it was possible to recalculate the RBR 
based on corrected and historical FAS, in order to compare 
with the RBR at NRV validated by ANEEL. ANEEL 
publishes the definitive result of each tariff review in 
TN. Each TN contains a table summarizing the approved 
RBR with NRV values. The FAS, ROE, tariff repositioning 
index (TRI), gross RBR (RBRg), market value in use 
(MVU), base value for remuneration (BVR), regulatory 
reintegration quota (RRQ), and capital remuneration (CR) 
variables were taken from this table and the ROE was 
calculated based on the data collected from the accounting 
statements. This table was reconstructed for each company 
with HC and RHC values for comparison purposes.
It is essential to establish which measure can represent 
fair value for the consumer and for the investor. It is 
understood that for the consumer the lowest tariff is best 
and for the investor the highest return is best. The fair 
value will obviously be at the equilibrium between both 
aims and this equilibrium needs to derive from some 
assumption. As already stated in this paper, fair value is 
considered to be one which enables recovery of capital 
invested corrected by inflation plus the return on this 
capital, which considers the actual cost of the capital 
applied. The consumer would not bear the cost of paying 
for new investments still to be carried out and would 
not benefit from losses in the capital previously invested 
by the investor. And the opposite would also not occur: 
investors benefiting because new investments are being 
funded by the consumer and not by them, or investors 
being adversely affected because they cannot recover 
investments previously made. Thus, it is understood that 
the main variables for the analysis are:
 ● TRI, where the lower the index, the lower the tariff; 
that is, it represents the greatest consumer interest;
 ● ROE, which constitutes one of the main measures 
of return and relates the investment made with 
the partner’s earnings; that is, it represents the 
investor interest, and the higher it is the better 
for the investor;
 ● Maintaining physical capital, which will be 
represented by FAS, and as with ROE, the higher 
it is the better for the investor, who will receive 
a higher return on the assets, as well as carrying 
out new investments.
With the data collected, it was also possible to analyze 
other variables:
 ● RBRg, which is the amount of FAS subtracted from 
SO, from totally depreciated goods, and from the 
overall utilization rate;
 ● MVU, which is calculated by FAS subtracted from 
accumulated depreciation;
 ● BVR, which represents MVU subtracted from the 
depreciated utilization rate;
 ● RRQ, which is the product of RBRg and the rate 
of depreciation;
 ● CR, which is the product between net RBR and the 
weighted average cost of capital (WACC) before 
calculating taxes.
For each variable, a comparison was carried out with 
the NRV and RHC measurement methods. It is worth 
noting that the choice of the two methods instead of 
others was due to the viability of carrying out an empirical 
analysis. The statistical treatment of the sample is described 
below.
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3.2 Statistical Treatment
After forming the database, the comparison of means 
test was carried out. In order to define the test to be 
applied, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) data normality 
test, indicated for the sample size used, was carried out. 
If the distribution was normal at a level of significance 
above 5% (p > 0.05), the Student t parametric test would be 
used; otherwise (p < 0.05), it would be used the Wilcoxon 
test, which would be a non parametric test. The result, 
which will be detailed below, showed that there is data 
normality, and so the Wilcoxon test was used, the main 
aim of which is to verify the direction and intensity of 
the differences in the two related samples.
In the case of this study, the aim is to investigate 
whether there are significant differences between the 
NRV and RHC methods for each variable. For this, the 
following procedure was adopted:
 ● The null hypothesis H0 indicates that there is no 
difference in the variables between the NRV and 
RHC measurement models.
 ● The alternative hypothesis H1 indicates that there 
is a difference in the variables between the NRV 
and RHC measurement models.
 ● 5% level of significance.
4. PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS 
The results found for the 2nd CPTR are presented in the 
next subsections. In the first, an analytical approach was 
used for the data corrected by the IPCA. In the second, 
a statistical analysis of the data was carried out. The last 
lays out the conclusions drawn from the evidence found.
4.1 Analytical Approach for the 2nd CPTR - IPCA
With the RBR data determined, first the percentage 
difference between the values found by the three 
measurement methods was calculated, based on the 
annual statement used for the 2nd CPTR and the respective 
TN, which provides the definitive results. These differences 
were calculated by dividing the NRV values by the 
corrected RHC values.
The results for the 44 companies can be seen in 
Table 3. As can be observed, the values are very diverse. 
Analyzing the differences between the NRV/RHC for 
the FAS variable, the closest result between the two 
methods is found for Celesc Distribuição S.A. (Celesc), 
in which FAS based on NRV is 1% higher, and for Energisa 
Borborema Distribuidora de Energia S.A. (Energisa BO), 
in which it is 1% lower. This result shows that the assets 
of these companies at NRV are reflecting the variation in 
purchasing power of the currency in the period analyzed. 
Cemig-Distribuição S.A. (Cemig-D) and Companhia 
Estadual de Energia Elétrica-Distribuição (CEEE-D) 
had the highest NRV/RHC percentage, with NRV being 
64% higher than FAS based on RHC, showing that the 
assets may be overestimated. As for Centrais Elétricas 
do Pará (Celpa), this presented the lowest percentage, 
with a 24% lower NRV than RHC, and therefore being 
underestimated.
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Table 3 Fixed assets in service – 2nd Cycle Periodic Tariff Review – extended consumer price index.
Companies NRV/RHC (%) Companies NRV/RHC (%) Companies NRV/RHC (%)
AES Sul 82 Chesp 142 Eletrobras – PI 132
Ampla 86 CNEE 130 Eletrobras – RO 106
Bandeirante 86 Cocel 109 Eletrobras – RR 88
Bragantina 102 Coelba 106 Eletrocar 133
Caiuá-D 125 Coelce 81 Eletropaulo 85
CEEE-D 164 Copel-D 135 Energisa BO 99
Celesc 101 Cosern 110 Energisa MG 95
Celg-D 108 CPFL paulista 96 Energisa NF 120
Celpa 76 CPFL Piratininga 111 Energisa PB 111
Celpe 92 CPFL Santa Cruz 126 Energisa SE 106
Celtins 128 EDEVP 150 Enersul 77
Cemar 98 EFLSM 160 Escelsa 91
Cemat 80 Elektro 106 Light Sesa 91
Cemig-D 164 Eletroacre 120 RGE 120
CFLO 142 Eletrobras – AL 124 - -
NRV/RHC (%)
Mean 111
Standard Deviation 24
Variance 0.06
RHC = restated historical cost; NRV = new replacement value.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
The measurements based on NRV were lower than 
those based on RHC for 36% of the companies (16 
companies). As shown in the conceptual review, a lower 
value based on NRV than that based on RHC benefits the 
consumer with lower tariffs; however, the investor does 
not recover their investment. The 16 concessionaires will 
be able to replace their assets at the end of their useful life. 
However, because the capital is not recovered, there will 
be resistance to carrying out future investments in other 
public tender processes, with investors in 16 companies 
being remunerated below inflation.
And, in the other companies (28), the NRV was higher 
than the RHC. In this case, when the value based on 
NRV is higher than the one based on RHC, the adversely 
affected party is the consumer, who is remunerating the 
investor for more than what the latter previously invested. 
This means than this investor is funding an asset that will 
still be constructed and not an asset that is being used. 
Here it is worth returning to the affirmation formulated 
in the introduction: NRV leads to current consumers 
bearing the costs of a good that will be acquired in the 
future, and not the services already provided.
On average, FAS based on NRV were 11% higher than 
those based on RHC; that is, there is an indication that, 
on average, the investor is receiving values above inflation 
and the consumers are spending more than necessary.
Table 4 shows the TRI. The result coincides with that 
of the previous table, in which FAS based on NRV are 
compared with those based on RHC. This result was 
already expected, given that capital remuneration (CR) 
and RRQ directly depend on the value of FAS. In the case 
of TRI, the lower the percentage is, the lower the tariff. It 
is worth noting that in the 2nd CPTR, of the 44 companies, 
only six had a tariff increase; that is, the TRI was positive 
[Ampla, EEB, Energisa BO, Escelsa Energia do Brasil, 
Energisa Nova Friburgo Distribuidora de Energia S.A. 
(Energisa NF), and Light Serviços de Eletricidade S.A. 
(Light)]. For the others, the TRI was negative, causing 
a fall in tariffs due to the methodology currently used; 
that is, NRV-NRV.
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Analyzing Table 4, it is perceived that 7 companies 
presented a positive TRI based on RHC. The result is the 
same when the NRV method is used, adding only AES Sul 
Distribuidora de Energia S.A. (AES Sul), for which the 
TRI based on RHC was positive by 0.15%. The greatest 
readjustment in the 2nd CPTR was that of Energisa NF, at 
11.04%, and the smallest was that of Elektro (Elektro), at 
20.52% negative. If the RHC methodology was adopted, 
Energisa NF would also present the greatest readjustment, 
but by a smaller percentage, of 7.66%, and Cemig-D 
would present the greatest fall in tariff, of 26.11%. The 
16 companies that presented the lowest FAS based on 
NRV also had a lower tariff in relation to RHC. The other 
28 had a higher TRI based on NRV than that calculated 
based on RHC, with the RHC method leading to lower 
tariffs for 64% of the companies. It can be inferred that 
when FAS calculated based on NRV is lower than when 
calculated based on RHC, the tariff will also be lower. 
The opposite is also true; that is, with a higher FAS value 
based on NRV than that based on RHC, the tariff will 
also be higher: however, in percentage terms it is not 
proportional. Cemig-D, which presented a 64% higher 
FAS-NRV, experienced a fall in tariff of approximately 
33%; that is, the TRI based on RHC was 26.11% negative, 
and that based on NRV was 19.68%; the TRI was also 
negative. For Celpa, which presented the lowest FAS based 
on NRV, 24% in relation to that based on RHC, there was 
an 8.38% fall with regards to the TRI calculation, and 
when measured based on RHC, it presented a 3.89% fall; 
that is, the difference between the two methods is more 
than 115% in this case.
Another important point is that the FAS value does not 
determine whether the TRI will be negative or positive. 
What it does determine is that, depending on the FAS 
value measured via each method, there will be a higher or 
lower tariff, but not whether the readjustment index will 
be positive or negative. This depends on other variables, 
such as the Portion A (which is not manageable) and the 
reference company amount, among others. On average, 
the tariffs at RHC were lower than those calculated using 
Table 4 Result of the tariff repositioning index at new replacement value and restated historical cost  – 2nd Periodic Tariff Review – 
extended consumer price index.
Companies NRV (%) RHC (%) Companies NRV (%) RHC (%)
AES Sul -2.74 0.15 CPFL Paulista -14.07 -13.55
Ampla 1.83 5.55 CPFL Piratininga -13.50 -14.50
Bandeirante -9.79 -7.73 CPFL Santa Cruz -17.05 -19.08
Bragantina 2.19 1.90 EDEVP -4.77 -7.82
Caiuá -8.05 -9.88 EFLSM -14.82 -19.83
CEEE-D -0.39 -6.84 Elektro -20.52 -21.35
Celesc -9.16 -9.28 Eletroacre -6.94 -9.84
Celg-D -9.56 -10.41 Eletrobras – AL -17.71 -20.18
Celpa -8.38 -3.89 Cepisa -10.33 -13.29
Celpe -6.16 -4.81 Eletrobras – RO -19.66 -20.28
Celtins -7.24 -10.59 Eletrobras – RR -20.05 -18.34
Cemar -11.03 -10.48 Eletrocar -2.67 -3.92
Cemat -5.91 -1.80 Eletropaulo -8.07 -5.53
Cemig-D -19.68 -26.11 Energisa BO 6.05 6.19
CFLO -6.60 -8.55 Energisa MG -7.40 -6.72
Chesp -10.25 -15.39 Energisa NF 11.04 7.66
CNEE -9.90 -11.69 Energisa PB -14.73 -16.02
Cocel -11.74 -12.48 Energisa SE -14.49 -15.33
Coelba -13.75 -14.81 Enersul -7.76 -1.93
Coelce -8.89 -5.11 Escelsa 4.41 6.10
Copel-D -7.49 -10.90 Light Sesa 2.06 4.12
Cosern -8.04 -9.57 RGE -8.11 -10.19
RHC = restated historical cost; NRV = new replacement value.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
NRV (%) RHC (%)
Mean -8.41 -9.01
Standard Deviation 7.11 8.08
Variance 0.01 0.01
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Table 5 Return on net equity at new replacement value and restated historical cost – 2nd Cycle Periodic Tariff Review – extended 
consumer price index. 
Companies NRV (%) RHC (%) Companies NRV (%) RHC (%)
AES Sul 5.06 -1.97 CPFL Paulista 42.12 27.72
Ampla 16.95 10.41 CPFL Piratininga 84.23 55.38
Bandeirante 16.96 7.40 CPFL Santa Cruz 31.92 29.64
Bragantina 4.10 1.22 EDEVP 5.49 4.38
Caiuá 0.28 0.71 EFLSM 21.31 18.67
CEEE-D 9.98 34.56 Elektro 38.72 23.74
Celesc 24.04 13.81 Eletroacre 0.08 -2.60
Celg-D -120.81 -29.52 Eletrobras – AL -16.82 -14.29
Celpa 9.07 2.55 Eletrobras – RO -95.84 -44.97
Celpe 32.91 22.70 Eletrobras – RR -33.74 -26.05
Celtins 5.04 1.83 Eletrocar 22.57 21.16
Cemar 22.00 14.73 Eletropaulo 30.04 6.11
Cemat 9.76 4.54 Energisa BO 20.70 14.15
Cemig-D 17.06 15.50 Energisa MG 6.81 3.05
CFLO 14.45 12.68 Energisa NF 21.41 12.15
Chesp 17.61 14.48 Energisa PB 16.16 10.64
CNEE 17.18 13.13 Energisa SE 13.87 7.43
Cocel 16.92 11.12 Enersul -6.31 -7.19
Coelba 31.78 20.13 Escelsa 18.24 8.23
Coelce 27.66 15.26 Light Sesa 64.59 26.48
Copel-D 23.34 15.13 RGE 16.00 9.15
Cosern 29.21 20.11 - -
RHC = restated historical cost; NRV = new replacement value.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
NRV, by -9.01% and -8.41%, respectively; that is, if the 
RHC method were used for the 2nd CPTR, the tariffs in 
the sample studied would, on average, be 0.60% lower 
than those authorized at NRV, which represents a 7.17% 
difference.
Table 5 presents the results with regards to the ROE 
variable. Eletrobras Distribuição Piauí (Cepisa) was 
removed from this analysis given that the company 
presented negative net equity (net capital deficiency) and a 
loss. As can be seen, five companies [Empresa Energética 
de Mato Grosso do Sul S.A. (Enersul), Eletrobras 
Distribuição Alagoas (Ceal), Boa Vista Energia (Boa 
Vista Energia), Ceron (Ceron), and Celg-D] presented a 
negative nominal ROE, given that in the year of the review 
they presented a loss; but for 38 companies, the nominal 
ROE was positive. With monetary correction, for the 5 
companies with a negative nominal ROE, the effective 
ROE remained negative, but in different percentages. The 
difference in the effective ROE for Enersul was 13.95%, 
turning from 6.31% negative into 7.19% negative. As for 
the others, the effective ROE decreased, despite continuing 
to be negative. Celg-D, for example, was the one that 
presented the greatest difference, moving from a negative 
nominal ROE of 120.81% to -29.25%, a difference of 
75.56%. The highest nominal ROE found was for CPFL 
Piratininga (CPFL Piratininga), at 84.23%, and when 
corrected by IPCA it became 55.38%, a fall in returns 
when inflation in the period is deducted. The lowest was 
for Eletrobras Distribuição Acre (Eletroacre), at 0.08%, 
and when updated, it becomes 2.60% negative. For the 
companies in which the nominal ROE was positive, when 
updated this becomes lower, with the exception of Caiuá 
and CEEE-D. The smallest difference was for Eletrocar, 
with a fall of 6.25%, and the biggest was for Eletropaulo, 
with a fall of almost 80%. When updated, AES Sul, which 
presented a nominal ROE of 5.06%, becomes 1.97% 
negative (-1.97%). On average, the nominal ROE was 
12.37% and the effective ROE was 9.38%. It is perceived 
that, in relation to the averages for FAS and TRI, there 
was a greater difference in terms of ROE between the 
two methods.
NRV (%) RHC (%)
Mean 12.37 9.38
Standard Deviation 32.99 16.94
Variance 0.11 0.03
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4.2. Statistical analysis of the 2nd CPTR – IPCA
The next step was to apply the test of means to verify 
the differences in the variables with regards to the 
measurement method (MRV vs. RHC) for the year in 
which the 2nd CPTR occurred, by carrying out a joint 
analysis of the companies.
As was already mentioned, in order to define the test 
that would be carried out, it should be verified whether the 
variables have a normal distribution or not. For this, due to 
the size of the sample, the K-S test was carried out. There 
are indications that the variables do not have a normal 
distribution, given that the probabilities were lower than a 
5% level of significance. As previously explained, with the 
variables not having a normal distribution, the Wilcoxon 
test was applied to evaluate the difference or not between 
these methods for each one of the variables. The results 
of these tests are presented in Table 6.
According to the results of the Wilcoxon test (Table 
6), with the exception of the ROE variable, the variables 
calculated based on RHC and on NRV were considered 
to be statistically equal. With probabilities higher than 
0.14, the null hypothesis was not rejected of equality 
between the two methods analyzed in the other variables. 
This means that there are no significant differences in the 
variables when the NRV and RHC measurement methods 
are applied. However, in relation to the ROE variable, 
with a probability lower than 0.001, the RHC and NRV 
methods were considered to be statistically different; that 
is, the null hypothesis of equality is rejected. This result 
supports the previous inferences that company returns 
can be overestimated, and also confirms the difference 
in average between the two methods, in the descriptive 
analysis. 
4.3 Conclusions from the Evidence Found
Despite not finding significant statistical differences 
between the methods in the global analysis, with the 
exception of the ROE variable, in verifying the specific 
cases a large number of “non-fair values” were found.
 ● It was found that, for 64% of the companies, FAS 
presents indications of being overestimated based 
on NRV, given that the value based on RHC was 
lower; that is, the FAS value using the NRV method 
was, on average, 11% lower than that calculated 
based on RHC. In this case, it can be affirmed 
that technological advancement does not lead to 
lower asset costs. The numbers cited above show 
that at least 16 companies are being remunerated 
above the rate of inflation; that is, their revenues 
exceed the capital invested. Therefore, the first 
hypothesis is accepted, in that measuring assets 
using the RHC method can contribute to reaching 
a fair value for the investor and the consumer, 
since it is not fair for some distributors to benefit 
and others not to. 
 ● With regards to investor returns, represented by 
the ROE variable, despite the limitations of using 
HC for comparison, it was evident that most of the 
concessionaires are presenting positive returns (38 
companies). When inflation is deducted, returns 
remain positive, but at lower percentages (36 
companies).
It can be affirmed that, on average, the companies are 
being adequately remunerated. RHC corrected by IPCA, 
as we affirmed, also provides a fair return for investors. 
The return calculated using RHC is closer to its economic 
value. However, in Brazil this was only the case on average 
and not for each one of the consumers and each one of the 
investors. Many consumers lost out and many consumers 
gained from the substitution of RHC by NRV, and the 
same applies for investors: many gained and many lost 
out with this new basis for measurement.
Table 6 Results of the Wilcoxon test – 2nd Cycle Periodic Tariff Review – extended consumer price index.
Indicator Statistic Probability Indicator Statistic Probability
FAU -0.455 0.649 CR -0.420 0.674
RRB -0.420 0.674 ROE -3.921 0.000*
TRI -1.470 0.141 BRV -0.478 0.632
RRQ -0.420 0.674 MVU -0.478 0.632
FAS = fixed assets in service; RBR = Regulatory basis for calculating remuneration; TRI = tariff repositioning index; RRQ = 
regulatory reintegration quota; ROE = return on net equity; CR = capital remuneration; BRV = base remuneration value; MVU = 
market value in use.
* statistically different.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
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In summary, the findings of the study allow for it to 
be suggested that the currently used NRV measurement 
method should be changed to the RHC method corrected 
using the official rate of inflation – IPCA, since it is 
understood that this method provides a fair value for 
the consumer and the investor, for the following reasons: 
greater transparency and less subjectivity when calculating 
fixed assets in service, and therefore CR and RRQ, 
contributing to minimizing the problem of informational 
asymmetry. It is understood that there will be less 
discrepancy between company remunerations, since as 
was seen, some are receiving above the capital invested 
and others are not, and fewer discrepancies between 
consumers, who today are separated into two main groups: 
winners and losers, with different distributions between 
each one of the groups.
It is therefore concluded that the use of NRV is a bad 
public policy because it either benefits the consumer but 
discourages the investor, or adversely affects the consumer 
and benefits the investor. Equality only occurs when NRV 
accompanies the rate of inflation. Thus, although there are, 
on average, no statistical differences between the RHC and 
NRV methods, the theoretical framework and arguments 
presented suggest that RHC is the most recommended 
method for assessing electricity sector assets. 
It is important to highlight that the results and 
conclusions found are exclusive to the regulated sector, 
in that tariffs are set by a regulatory body, and the 
RC method is relevant for commercial and industrial 
companies (mainly) from competitive sectors when their 
replacement costs are rising and they need, through their 
own activities, to raise funds to replace their assets.
For example, in a commercial activity it is extremely 
relevant that in the case of selling goods that have 
experienced an increase in RC, the stored goods are sold 
at an adjusted price in order to be able to raise sufficient 
funds for their replacement. Otherwise, the seller will 
have to inject capital or take out a loan to renew this stock. 
The discussion in this paper is, however, the use of 
RC in public service concessionaire companies whose 
tariffs are regulated, as tariffs based on the RC of a fixed 
asset that has increased, passed onto the consumer, 
attributes the responsibility to the consumer to provide 
funds that investors should invest in this replacement; 
this responsibility should not be that of consumers. And 
if the tariff produces the funds for this renewal, why 
should investors receive remuneration for an asset that 
they did not fund?
In the case of a lower replacement price than that of 
the asset to be renewed, something different occurs: if the 
seller prices the good being sold based on a replacement 
that will require a smaller investment, they will in fact be 
able to replace this product, but they will suffer a loss of 
capital invested in the good being sold. In the case of a 
tariffed service, if the fixed asset needs a smaller investment 
to replace the previous one, and the tariff accompanies this 
decrease, this is great for the consumer, but the investor 
may not be able to recover their investment, which would 
discourage them from continuing in the segment and 
discourage others from entering, unless they managed 
to increase the rate of return contained within the tariff 
in order to compensate for the increase in risk being 
incurred. For deeper analyses of the problems of variation 
in replacement price, including in the presence of inflation, 
see Szuster (1985).
Finally, the conclusion from the empirical and realistic 
analysis in the Brazilian setting is what the statistical 
analysis shows: for Brazil, replacement price does not, 
on average, present any significant difference compared 
to using pure and simple monetary correction for assets 
instead of new replacement values; but this simply hides 
something very relevant, since the average is derived from 
two main groups: (i) consumers who are paying more 
for energy services than they should, which constitutes 
a visible benefit to investors and adversely affects these 
consumers; and (ii) consumers who are paying less than 
they should, which benefits them, but adversely affects 
the investors. 
5. FINAL REMARKS
This article sought to demonstrate the effects of each 
concept and criterion in treating the RBR of assets and 
their influence on tariff setting in the Brazilian electricity 
sector, based on theories of equity valuation and finance. 
The two measurement methods most widely used in the 
electricity sector around the world (NRV and RHC) were 
empirically analyzed.
The NRV method causes uncertainties with regards 
to evaluating assets, both for the consumer and for the 
investor, due to the fact that most of the inputs used are 
commodities with considerable market volatility. The 
value calculated using this method may not be the same 
at that from the time the investment was carried out, 
given that at that time it was what was most efficient. 
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As laid out in this study, regulation needs to be efficient 
and leave little room for discretion, in order to avoid 
government opportunism. Moreover, constant changes in 
the rules lead to uncertainty in the sector. It is suggested 
for future cycles that an assessment of the totality of 
assets be repeated in a simplified manner and in the most 
assertive way possible, considering the prices at the time 
of their immobilization; that is, the concessionaire should 
be remunerated by the value of the investment actually 
made, and based on this, a correction should be carried 
out using the IPCA.
Any interpretation of this study should include some 
limitations: the literature with regards to the topic is scare; 
it was not possible to analyze all of the concessionaires 
in the electricity sector due to it being impossible to 
access the data. However, it is worth noting that the 
sample represents 70% of the companies, and as already 
mentioned, accounts for more than 95% of the country’s 
consumer units; the model adopted to calculate the 
inflationary effects was carried out with approximate 
values, as a correction of stocks was not possible, as well 
as the exact dates of acquisition or retirement of each 
asset, for example. 
Based on the analysis carried out, the measurement 
of assets in the Brazilian electricity sector using RHC 
is defended, due to the evidence presented throughout 
this article, given that it was shown that RHC decreases 
investor risk and uncertainties regarding return on 
invested capital, as they will receive what was actually 
spent at the time of investment, monetarily corrected by 
IPCA (which is considered representative of the official 
Brazilian rate of inflation). Using the NRV method, this 
risk is inherent, since investments are remunerated by the 
value that will be replaced, at the time of the assessment 
report, which may present different values (higher or 
lower), mainly due to the volatility of commodities and 
technological advancement. It is interesting that the test 
of means did not detect any statistical difference at a 5% 
level of significance between the RHC and NRV methods, 
taking into account the country as a whole. There was, on 
average, compensation between investor and consumer 
gains and losses, which does not characterize a fair tariff.
Another point that warrants highlighting is that, as 
was already laid out over the course of this study, with the 
application of RHC, consumers bear the cost of what was 
really spent by the investor and not an amount that may 
be funding future investments; that is, the concessionaires 
may be being remunerated for investments not carried out, 
thus burdening consumers. The opposite can also occur if 
the NRV method is adopted, given that the investor can 
receive less than was spent, representing an expropriation 
of wealth by the regulator and a lack of incentives for 
new ventures. Therefore, the conclusion is reached that 
replacement price tends to always lead to a loss for the 
consumer and benefit the investor, or exactly the opposite, 
depending on the evolution of this price with regards 
to inflation. Once again, these facts occur in individual 
analyses, since on average there is no statistical difference.
It is therefore believed that measuring assets using 
RHC is a fair public policy for setting tariffs in order to 
benefit the parties involved.
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